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Corporations and Professionalism: Awkward bed-fellows? 
 
“A corporation may be defined to be a collection of many individuals united 
into one body, under a special denomination, having perpetual succession 
under an artificial form, and vested, by policy of the law, with the capacity 
of acting, in several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and 
granting property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, 
of enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a 
variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of 
its institution, or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its 
creation, or at any subsequent period of its existence.” 
— Joseph Chitty (1820) A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the 
Crown p121 
 
Upon reading this piece by Burmeister I was struck first, and last, by what seems 
to me to be the core conundrum at the heart of the issues with which it deals.  
The paper focuses upon (i) a critique of codes of conduct and the value of 
creating a global code for information and communication technology (ICT) – 
which it supports, (ii) a critique of ICT professional certification – which it 
supports, and then (iii) explores the debate over whether ICT is really a 
profession or simply artisan activity, opting for it being a ‘young profession’.  At 
each turn the focus upon individual professionalism, and the ethical behavior 
deemed either central or at least adjunct to it, is contrasted with “corporate 
settings where their personal professionalism is challenged by corporate 
business demands”.  At the heart of these critiques and explorations is the fact 
that corporate entities are legal fictions whose signatories enjoy limited liability 
(since the British Limited Liability Act 1855), and not individuals with morals 
and consciences who must deal personally with the consequences of their 
actions.  
 
Professionalism, as Burmeister stresses through his quotation from Tinholt et al., 
is something humans acquire over time, through the ctivities of their profession 
and engagement with others: “the very nature of professional work means that 
some knowledge and skills are best developed through experience, and that an 
understanding of complex issues, such as ethics, grows with maturity” (Tinholt 
et al., 2015, p78).  Professionalism, thus, is not just associated with, but implies 
awareness and application of ethics, and adherence to codes of conduct that 
embody the values of such ethical considerations. As Burmeister succinctly puts 
it, “For the professional, ethics is just what it means to do your job well on your 
own terms”. 
 
Legal fictions such as limited companies and corporations, by contrast, have no 
capacity for such growth and maturation. “The notion of limited liability,” as 
Rona puts it, “in creating an actor with a separate personality from those who act 
under its umbrella, created the vehicle without moral capacity for the realization 
of a set of doctrines without moral content by the group acting in its name under 
its umbrella” (Rona 2013.)  In other words, there is a fundamental amorality 
about the socio-economic entity, ‘the corporation’ (a vehicle that has no moral 
capacity) that, because the doctrines governing its activities are without moral 
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content (profit is king!) is inevitably at odds with individual professionalism, 
which, by contrast, is inherently moral in character.  Professionals, working 
under the umbrella of corporations, are thus inherently subject to constraints 
and restrictions on the ethical character of their professionalism. 
 
Contrasting ethical positions are captured in this stand-off (Stahl 2012:641).  
Defenders of corporations, it may be argued, are adopting utilitarian positions as 
laid out by Bentham and Mill, asserting that overall utility is maximized when 
there is more profit, and that entrepreneurial societies over the past two 
centuries have created more wealth than any other societies in history, 
massively improving the lives of the many billions of people in the world. 
Opponents, it may equally be argued, are adopting more Kantian deontological 
positions, focusing upon the morality and ethics of the intentions of the agents 
involved.  The crux of problem, perhaps, is that whilst individuals are agents 
with conscience, capable of experience and maturation, and of professionalism, 
corporations are agents devoid of such characteristics or capacities; they are 
agents of utilitarianism incapable of a deontological ethical stance.  The 
corporation, therefore, it could be argued, enforces utilitarianism upon those 
working under its umbrella, contrary to the more deontological character of 
professionalism.   
 
For Rona, the essence of the problem is in the shift in economic understanding 
from a practice to a theory.  As he says, in the early nineteenth century the shift 
in the former understanding of economics as “a moral science,” to becoming “one 
of the natural sciences” promoted “the idea that economics as a science may be 
elaborated without regard to the ethical content of its manifestations,” placing 
“ethics in economic life not only in a substantially reduced, but also in some 
respects in an entirely new domain” (Rona 2013).  In the 20th century this shift 
became greatly enhanced through the computational calculations of market 
fundamentalist economics, which argued that all human agents should be 
understood as ‘rational agents’ – meaning that human individuals should be 
regarded as behaving in the manner of corporations, interested ultimately – and 
amorally - only in their own profit.  This characterization of human individuals 
makes their behaviour susceptible to game theory calculation, and renders 
economics calculable by computers: economics as a natural rather than a moral 
science.  The outcome is familiar to any critic of contemporary capitalism: 
“Ethical considerations are expelled from the part of life that is directed at 
creating the material conditions of well being, and moral sentiments are 
henceforth seen as ‘exogeneous’ to the laws governing its pursuit” (Rona 2013).  
 
The notion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and its lesser but 
increasingly important sibling, Corporate Data Responsibility (CDR), are the 
means by which those concerned about such amorality at the heart of our 
entrepreneurial culture have been attempting, in recent years, to try to redress 
it.   CSR and CDR policies are meant to function as a self-regulatory mechanism 
whereby corporations monitor and ensure their active compliance with the 
spirit of the law, ethical standards and national or international norms. 
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It might be suggested that embedding CSR and CDR into individual 
professionalism might help instil such behaviour into corporations – it is, after 
all, individuals who work in corporations, even those who sit upon the Board of 
Directors and own and manage them.  But the increasingly abstract and 
globalized nature of corporatism, whereby Boards of Directors are responsible to 
shareholders who are themselves, increasingly, financial vehicles such as Funds, 
which are responsible to their investors exclusively for producing profit, rather 
than individuals with a pride in the company and its activities, means that all 
considerations of CSR and CDR must inevitably be set below those of the bottom 
line – regardless of ethical considerations. 
 
The project of IP3, then, surely provides the best hope for promoting the success 
of individual professionalism, to the extent that its adoption by corporate entities 
creates the equivalent of a moral and ethical conscience for such legal fictions – a 
process constituting a brake upon the activities of the company that is more 
powerful than that of the profit motive.   Developing over time with the 
maturation of the company, this brake would curtail the activities of the 
company, even to the extent where it may (at least in the short-term) make less 
money for its shareholders, holding out the hope (with no guarantee) that more 
profit may result through enhanced reputation, better working practices, 
happier staff, happier customers, and a healthier working and partnership 
environment.   IP3, in this sense, would enhance CSR and CDR.    
 
Without sanction, however, I fear, and some substantive and reputable regime of 
surveillance of company activity whereby continued certification was contingent 
upon good behaviour, IP3 might become a meaningless kite-mark for 
organisations intent on displaying the correct window-dressing rather than upon 
acting within the restraints of professional codes of conduct.  This may be a tall 
order. As Burmiester says, in the current climate, “if…values are seen as a code of 
ethics, and the rest as a code of conduct, then it appears that a global code of 
ethics is achievable, whereas a global code of conduct is not”. 
 
In the final analysis, we must ask the question, why should corporate entities not 
be legally restrained from behaving unethically, rather than our relying upon 
relatively ineffective self-regulation?  The normativity of the situation is no guide 
to its ethical or moral rightness – as Stahl reminds us, “’ought’ cannot be deduced 
from ‘is’” (Stahl 2012:650).  The answer, surely, is in the power that corporations 
have gained, in our political economy, in the transnational character of their 
activities and the relative parochialism of national legal frameworks; in the 
extent to which multinational corporations have written the rules of global trade 
agreements, to their advantage, over the objections of those who would seek to 
curtail their activities.  Considerations of professionalism in ICT need to be wary 
of being too functional when addressing corporate realities, and avoid taking “for 
granted the socio-economic system in which organizations use technology and 
[failing to] question the justification of distributions of resources and power” 
(Stahl 2012:650). 
 
Burmeister’s conclusion, then, is key: “Until now there has been little recognition 
of the corporatisation of ICT professionals and the effect that has on their ability 
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to engage in appropriate professional ethics. More research is needed to explore 
appropriate ways in which ethical behaviour can be encouraged in the corporate 
workplace”.  This, indeed, is all the more important in the current climate of 
increasing in-housing of ICT services by corporations.  
 
Many corporations have greatly improved their corporate cultures, and wear the 
badges of CSR much more than skin-deep (Al-Saggaf et al., 2015).  Yet the 
conundrum at the core of the issues raised in Burmeister’s paper, it seems, will 
continue to present problems for ICT professionals and for the (slow) roll-out of 
IP3, so long as the power of amoral legal fictions remains unbridled. 
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